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REVIEW OF THE MONTH
Movement of gold from Europe to the
United States, which had been in large volume
in the spring, declined sharply early in July
and then virtually ceased. The dollar price













as to render gold shipments
to the United States unusually profitable; but
in July it rose to a point at which gold pur-
chased in London no longer yielded a profit
when sold in New York, after deduction of
costs. Gold imports continued to arrive, how-
ever, from Canada and from Japan.
The Japanese Minister of Finance had an-
nounced early in March that $14,000,000 of
gold would be exported and that more would
be shipped if necessary. By the end of July
$130,000,000 of Japanese gold had been
shipped to this country. Late in July a plan
was announced for revaluing the gold re-
serves of the Bank of Japan on the basis of
a gold content for the yen about 13 percent
higher than the gold equivalent of the current
exchange rate. The proposed revaluation
will increase the Bank's gold reserves by
about 160 percent and will yield the Gov-
ernment a profit of about 800,000,000 yen
($250,000,000), of which it is reported that
some 200,000,000 yen will be utilized to repay
advances from the Bank of Japan, and the
remainder will be allocated to an exchange
stabilization fund.
Other important developments in relation
to gold were the revaluation of gold reserves
of the Bank of France and enlargement of
the resources of the British Exchange Equali-
zation Account, which are discussed later in
this review. During the month the United
States Treasury made arrangements to sell
up to $60,000,000 of gold to Brazil at such
times and in such amounts as the Brazilian
Government might request, and to sell gold
to China and purchase silver in order to as-
sist the Chinese Government in maintaining
stability of the yuan. On July 20 the Treas-
ury's inactive gold account showed a reduc-
tion of $42,000,000. This was the first reduc-
tion in this account since its establishment on
December 24, 1936. Prior to this decline the
gold held inactive by the Treasury amounted
to $1,213,000,000. Nearly two-thirds of this
was acquired through the heavy movement
of funds to the United States during the
spring.
This movement of funds was associated to
a considerable extent with dishoarding of
gold in London. It reflected the second wave










on the eve of the new currency ar-
rangement, it is estimated that from $1,500,-
000,000 to $2,000,000,000 of gold was hoarded
in Europe. Estimates of this character
necessarily have a wide margin of error.
Some of the basic information is shown in
the table on the next page.
While most of the data in the table are
officially reported, figures for gold reaching
the outside world from the U. S. S. R. repre-
sent, in the absence of Soviet figures, aggre-
gates of net gold imports from the U. S. S. R.
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reported by other countries. Somewhat sim-
ilar methods have been employed for China,
Straits Settlements, and Egypt. Figures for
the return of coin and scrap and for indus-
trial consumption are based in part on reg-
ularly reported statistics, in part upon scat-
tered data and estimates.
The table starts with the year 1931, in
which the international crisis developed and
gold hoarding on a large scale began. It in-
dicates that in the period 1931 through Sep-
tember 1936 gold to the amount of $3,450,-
000,000 went into unreported central holdings
or into private hoards, mainly in Europe. The
amount of gold in stabilization funds and
other unreported holdings of governments
and central banks in September can be known
only within broad limits, but it is believed
that the amount was in the neighborhood of
$1,700,000,000. Of the $1,500,000,000 to $2-
000,000,000 accumulated in private holdings
in Europe, perhaps two-thirds was in the
London market, much of it held by nationals
of countries other than England.
The first substantial dishoarding movement
occurred last fall. At the end of September
• 1936 the series of crises to which France, the
Fall dishoarding
movement
Netherlands, and Switzerland had been sub-
jected in connection with the
defense of their existing gold
parities ended with major
readjustments downward in the exchange
rates of these countries. At the same time
the Tripartite Declaration, indicating a com-
mon policy of maintaining stability on the
new exchange basis, subject to the require-
ments of internal prosperity, was issued by
England, France, and the United States. Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland sub-
sequently announced their adherence to this
declaration. The new international currency
arrangement was followed by increased ac-
tivity in the capital markets of all the par-
ticipating countries. Stock prices in France,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands rose at a
more rapid rate than in the United States, and
in England there was a moderate advance.
In conjunction with this expansion of stock-
market activity capital flowed to the former
gold-bloc countries as well as to the United
States—much of it coming from gold and
other resources previously held idle in Lon-
don. During October and the first half of
November, while Europeans reduced their
deposits in this country, they greatly in-
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creased the rate of their investment in Amer-
ican securities.
These developments indicate that the sub-
stantial dishoarding of gold which occurred
in the fall was in response to an increased
feeling of security in regard to currency re-
lationships and to a belief that investment
opportunities were exceptionally attractive.
The dishoarding movement of this spring
was of quite a different character. It oc-
curred at a time of weakness or uncertainty
in most of the leading stock
markets of the world. Pro-
ceeds of the sales of dis-
hoarded gold, insofar as they came to the
United States, were apparently not invested,
but were largely held idle on deposit with
American banks. The movement was accom-
panied by rumors of impending reductions
in the American gold price, and at the close
of the movement the French franc, which
had suffered a sharp decline in April, under-
went a more severe crisis, with the result


















This sequence of events began with a de-
cline in the American stock market in the
middle of March. Foreign buying interest,
which had receded to more moderate levels
since the first wave of dishoarding in the fall,
disappeared altogether, and in April foreign-
ers sold American securities on balance.
Meanwhile, however, a gold scare had oc-
curred, accompanied by dishoarding and a
heavy movement of European funds into
American bank deposits. This movement
was accelerated by a rise in sterling to levels
which the market did not regard as perma-
nent, and a consequent increase in the dis-
count on sterling for future delivery which
increased the inducement to move bank funds
to New York. At the greater forward dis-
count a better return could be realized by
London banks through placing funds in New
York and buying future sterling back at a
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The return in London represents the rate per annum earned on
three-months British Treasury bills on the basis of the Friday
tender; the return in New York is on a daily basis and represents
the profit (expressed as percent per annum) obtained when
sterling: funds are employed to purchase spot dollars, and simul-
taneously a contract is made to convert the dollars back into a
larger amount of sterling three months later. Such a profit is
possible only when forward sterling is at a discount. Minor inci-
dental expenses or the possibility of obtaining interest in the New
York market have been disregarded. Most of the movement of
short-term funds into the United States this spring took the form
of deposits in American banks without interest.
discount than could be made by lending the
same funds in the London open market. This
situation is shown in the second chart on this
page; the first chart shows the rise in sterling
in April, which was to a considerable extent
the result of the heavy American purchases
of gold in London. The rise in sterling was
halted at the end of April, but dishoarding
continued and the gold flow to the United
States was sustained. Toward the end of the
movement funds began to leave France in
large volume, and while most of these funds
went in the first instance to London and
other nearby centers, indirectly they con-
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tributed to the movement to the United
States.
From the end of March through the first
week of July $775,000,000 of gold was re-
ceived from abroad and added to the Treas-
ury's stock of inactive gold. During this
period the volume of gold produced or dis-
hoarded abroad was of comparable mag-
nitude. Since September 1936 more than
$1,000,000,000 of gold appears to have come
out of private holdings, leaving a remainder
probably considerably less than $1,000,000,-
000. As the dishoarding movement has been
chiefly concentrated in London, the amount
of hoarded gold still held in that market must
now be less than half a billion dollars.
Early in July the British authorities took
action to enlarge the resources of the Equali-
„ . , zation Fund. The capacity
Slerhng exchange Qf ^ -^ t() buy goM .f need be was raised by £200,-
000,000 (about $1,000,000,000). This action
was proposed to Parliament in the midst of
the French crisis in the latter part of June
when French funds were moving in large
volume to London. After the readjustment
downward of the franc and the institution of
new budgetary measures, this movement of
funds was reversed. The backflow of French
money, however, did not depress sterling,
which, on the contrary, rose during the first
three weeks of July under the influence of
market forces, among them a transfer of
Japanese funds from New York to London.
The rise of sterling to new high levels served
to maintain the unusual discount on forward
sterling, and this in turn continued to exert
an influence against the return of' British
funds from New York to London.
In France the outflow of capital during
the second quarter of the year resulted in a
_ , „ financial crisis. Depletion of
French financial rn , , -. ,.
developments Treasury cash and exhaustion
of the gold resources of the
French Stabilization Fund in June were fol-
lowed by a change of Government and the
adoption of a new financial program. The
June crisis was the second of the year for
France, the first having come to a head early
in March as the result of a persistent outflow
of capital during the four preceding months.
The principal measures taken to meet the sit-
uation in March were removal of the restric-
tions on private dealings in gold imposed by
the law of October 1, 1936, creation of a new
administration for the Stabilization Fund,
flotation of a large loan with a foreign ex-
change guarantee, and an undertaking, in
view of improved economic conditions, to re-
duce Government expenditures. The details
of this program were made known on March
5. Subsequently there was a, considerable re-
turn flow of capital to France, and the franc,
which -had fallen from -about 4.65 to 4.50
cents, recovered a large part of its losses.
French exchange continued to rise until the
end of the first week in April, when rumors
of an impending reduction in the American
price for gold led to a speculative demand for
dollars in foreign markets. The franc, in com-
mon with other leading currencies, was sub-
jected to pressure. But while the degree of
decline in other currencies was narrowly re-
stricted, the franc suffered a severe descent.
The speculative demand for dollars gradually
subsided following President Roosevelt's
statement on April 9 that he knew of no
plan to reduce the price of gold, but the franc
never recovered from its decline. Continued
application of the social reform measures en-
acted in 1936, labor difficulties and demands
by labor for additional social reforms, the
persistence of a heavy import surplus, and
rumors regarding the position of the Treas-
ury, served to create nervousness regarding
the political outlook and the economic situa-
tion- Disappointing tax receipts for April,
reported at the end of May, further contrib-
uted to the uneasiness of the markets. Dur-
ing the first half of June, while the Govern-
ment was preparing its financial program,
capital left France in large amounts. By the
middle of June the gold resources of the Sta-
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bilization Fund were exhausted. While of-
ficial support had served to maintain a fairly-
steady rate of exchange for spot francs, the
prevailing uncertainty was reflected in the
appearance of unusually wide discounts on
francs for future delivery.
At this juncture the Cabinet decided to re-
quest authority to take financial measures by
decree rather than to submit detailed legisla-
tion to Parliament. Following two refusals
by the Senate to grant the authority in the
form requested the Cabinet resigned on June
21 and a new Cabinet was formed by Camille
Chautemps. Former Premier Blum was made
Vice-Premier and Finance Minister Auriol,
who became Minister of Justice, was replaced
by Georges Bonnet, at that time Ambassador
of France to the United States.
No definitive action was taken by the new
Government until June 29, following the re-
turn of Finance Minister Bonnet from the
United States. On that day the stock and
commodity exchanges were closed, postpone-
ment of commercial obligations expressed in
gold or foreign exchange was authorized, and
the Government's program was presented.
On June 30 Parliament voted to authorize the
Government until August 31, 1937, to take
by decree "any measures tending to insure the
repression of attacks on the credit of the
State, the prevention of speculation, economic
recovery, control of prices, equilibrium of the
budget and of the Treasury, and the defense,
without exchange control, of the reserves of
the Bank of France." On July 1 the stock
market was reopened and the privilege of
postponing commercial payments was can-
celled. The commodity markets were not re-
opened until July 6.
In explaining the necessity for the grant
of decree powers to the Government the
Finance Minister revealed that gold losses by
the Bank of France and the Stabilization
Fund between June 1 and 28 had amounted
to nearly 7,800,000,000 francs, or approxi-
mately $350,000,000. He also disclosed the
difficult position of the Treasury. On June
29 the Treasury's cash resources amounted
to only 20,000,000 francs, and obligations at
the end of June were met by exceptional
means.
The first measure taken by the Govern-
ment under the new powers was a decree,
dated June 30 to take effect July 1, removing
the limits to exchange movements of the franc
laid down in the law of October 1,1936. The
October law abolished the former gold con-
tent of the franc and authorized the Govern-
ment to fix the gold content, by decree, at
not more than about 75 percent nor less than
about 66 percent of its previous amount.
Pending such a decree the Stabilization Fund
established by the law was required to main-
tain the gold value of the franc within the
above limits, which worked out, in terms of
dollars, at 4.96 and 4.35 cents respectively.
The decree of June 30 removing these limits
is published on a later page of this issue of
the BULLETIN. The same decree approves a
convention providing that the Bank of France
shall make additional temporary advances to
the Treasury without interest for a maxi-
mum amount of 15,000,000,000 francs. On
July 1 the franc was quoted in this market
at 3.84 cents, a decline of approximately 14
percent from the June level and of about 2
percent from the pre-depression parity of
3.92 cents.
Assurance that the Tripartite Agreement
of September 25,1936, would remain in effect
between France, England, and the United
States was contained in communications on
July 1 between the Treasuries of the three
countries. Secretary Morgenthau addressed
the following message to the French Minister
of Finance, and a similar message was sent
by the British authorities:
"Now that the French Ministry of Finance has
been given the powers which it sought to meet the
present situation, I look forward to a continuation of
close cooperation between our Treasuries under the
Tripartite Declaration.
"May I express to you the sincere hope that France
will soon emerge from the temporary difficulties with
which she is now confronted?"
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Finance Minister Bonnet replied as fol-
lows :
"I wish to express my heartfelt thanks for the
wishes you were kind enough to convey to me. The
French Government attaches the greatest value to
the close collaboration which unites the two Treas-
uries. The energetic efforts we are now making to
achieve our financial rehabilitation will allow us to
pursue fruitfully the policy of the Tripartite Decla-
ration and to put an end to the difficulties with
which we have been confronted."
Further monetary measures were taken in
the latter part of July. Following the resig-
nation of Governor Labeyrie of the Bank of
France and his replacement by Pierre Four-
nier, first Deputy Governor of the Bank, a
convention was concluded between the Treas-
ury and the Bank of France providing for the
second revaluation of the gold reserves of the
Bank since last September. Under a con-
vention approved by the law of October 1,
1936, the Bank's gold reserves had been re-
valued at the rate of 49 milligrams of gold
0.900 fine per franc, the upper limit to the
gold value of the franc set by that law. Un-
der the new convention the gold reserves are
to be revalued at the rate of 43 milligrams of
gold 0.900 fine per franc, the lower limit set
by the law of October 1, although this limit
is no longer in effect. The resulting incre-
ment will amount to about 6,800,000,000
francs and will be allocated to a fund estab-
lished for the purpose of regulating the mar-
ket for government securities. Purchases of
securities by this fund, in addition to their
direct effect upon security prices, will in-
crease the available resources of the money
market and tend to ease credit conditions
generally. At the end of July both short
and long-term money rates in France were
substantially above those in other leading
centers. The discount rate of the Bank of
France was 5 percent, to which it was reduced
from 6 percent on July 7. The open-market
rate of discount in Paris was also about 5 per-
cent compared with rates of ^ percent or less
in New York, London, and Amsterdam. Most
government securities in France yielded more
than 5 percent compared with about 2% per-
cent in the United States and less than S
1^
percent in England.
For the remainder of 1937 French Treas-
ury requirements, as announced by Finance
Minister Bonnet, will be in excess of 30,-
000,000,000 francs. Advances from the Bank
of France under the convention of June 30
will cover 15,000,000,000 francs of this
amount. Decrees dated July 8 increased tax
rates on incomes of 20,000 francs or over by
20 percent, raised other direct and indirect
taxes by substantial amounts, and made tax
evasion more difficult. It was estimated that
these measures would yield between 3 and
4,000,000,000 francs of additional revenue in
a half year. Increases in railroad fares and
freight rates were expected to reduce the
amount of the railway deficit, for which the
Treasury is responsible, by 1,000,000,000
francs. Measures to reduce expenditures are
in progress.
Anti-speculative measures include a decree,
promulgated July 2, which prohibits com-
modity prices from being increased except as
officially approved for certain reasons such as
the higher cost of imported products. To-
wards the end of June, according to official
announcement, banks were instructed to cur-
tail their foreign exchange business, par-
ticularly forward operations. A decree of
July 8 imposed a tax of 100 percent on the
profits derived from speculative forward pur-
chases of gold or foreign exchange negotiated
between June 10 and 30 and falling due after
June 28.
Following its initial decline French ex-
change rose moderately during the first two
weeks of July. In the third week, however, it
broke sharply. At the end of July the franc
was quoted at about 3.75 cents, which was
somewhat above the low point reached, but
about 2 percent below the level at the begin-
ning of the month.
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